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  During the early 1620’s, England went through a period of intense economic disorders which 
sparked the interest of many in economic reasoning. The decade witnessed the emergence of the most 
relevant pieces of economic literature of the early Stuart era, but the debate was not restricted to the 
abstract  confrontation  of  economic  writers.  The  fundamental  issue  at  stake  in  the  controversies 
between  Malynes,  Misselden,  and  Mun  –  the  integration  of  money  and  international  trade  in  a 
coherent explanation of economic phenomena – was also the subject of much care in the political 
arena at large. The 1621 parliamentary session, in particular, put in evidence not only the fundamental 
relevance of the matter for understanding England’s economic maladies, but also the great difficulties 
involved in its investigation. By bringing all these elements together, the paper seeks to articulate a 
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  Durante o início da década de 1620, a Inglaterra passava por um período de intensos distúrbios 
econômicos que despertaram o interesse de muitos em sua investigação. A década testemunhou a 
emergência das obras econômicas mais relevantes do início do período Stuart, mas o debate não se 
restringiu às confrontrações abstratas de autores econômicos. A questão fundamental em jogo durante 
as controvérsias entre Malynes, Misselden e Mun – a integração entre moeda e comércio internacional 
em uma explicação coerente dos fenômenos econômicos – foi também objeto de muita atenção na 
esfera política em geral. A sessão parlamentar de 1621, em particular, colocou em evidência não 
apenas  a  relevância  fundamental  do  problema  para  a  compreensão  das  mazelas  econômicas  da 
Inglaterra, mas também as grandes dificuldades envolvidas em sua investigação. Ao reaproximar todos 
estes elementos, este artigo procura articular um retrato mais denso e significativo do estado corrente 
das idéias econômicas na Inglaterra do início do século XVII. 
 
Key words: economia pré-clássica; mercantilismo; século XVII; Inglaterra Stuart; Thomas Mun.      
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Economic ideas in early Stuart England are certainly not the most popular of subjects, but 
they  belong,  nevertheless,  to  a  rich  historiographic tradition.  Scholars interested  in  the  history  of 
economic thought have been concerned with it for a long time – actually, since Adam Smith’s time, 
when economics, or political economy, had its first claim at intellectual maturity. At the same time 
that a new intellectual discipline was born, assessments were being made about its ancestry, about 
those  who  had  contributed  to  the  development  of  ideas  related  to  the  processes  of  creating, 
distributing, and consuming wealth. Smith himself had some words to say about those 17
th and 18
th 
century pamphleteers who had developed a few doctrines related to foreign trade and international 
monetary flows – the “mercantile system”, as he termed it, following Mirabeau. Sadly, those were not 
very complimentary words. To Smith, the mercantile system was little more than a common sense, 
largely  unstated  collection  of  maxims  and  rules  of  thumb,  based  upon  faulty  assumptions  and 
fallacious  reasoning.  Moreover,  Smith  believed  that  these  ideas  had  been  infused  in  public 
consciousness through the efforts of self-interested parties, especially merchants who tried to disguise 
their own favored policies with a garb of concern with the commonwealth
1. In the decades to come, 
although efforts were being made (especially by McCulloch) to recover and publicize the original 
pamphlets and treatises, Smith’s harsh judgment prevailed as the standard attitude to early modern 
economic ideas among the Classical school adherents. 
A different approach to the subject would only come up during the late 19
th century, when 
members of the German historical school of economics introduced a new historiographical category – 
merkantilismus – and with it a whole new interpretation of pre-Smithian economic doctrines. Whereas 
Smith  had  denounced  a  “conspiracy  of  trade”  to  implement  policies  which  were  on  the  whole 
damaging to national wealth, a new generation of scholars led by Gustav Schmoller in Germany and, 
to a lesser extent, William Cunningham in England recovered the theme, and what they saw there was 
a legitimate strategy to promote economic growth along nationalistic lines
2. Still, as Charles Wilson 
has noted more than half a century ago, Smith’s and Schmoller’s standpoints do not differ as markedly 
as it would seem at first sight. Actually, their accounts of thought and policy are fairly similar, the 
main difference being that, to use Wilson’s words, one applauds where the other condemns (WILSON, 
1969a, p. 68). 
The debate over mercantilism carried along these lines for the next few decades, roughly as a 
contest between liberal and nationalistic interpretations of history, until the subject was given a new 
breath of life in the 1930’s – not coincidentally, at a time when nationalistic policies held a renewed 
appeal. The decade saw the theme debated by the likes of Jacob Viner
3, John Maynard Keynes
4, E. A. 
J. Johnson
5, Max Beer
6, and, above all, Eli Heckscher
7. Maybe even more significantly, it witnessed 
the incorporation of mercantilist studies into the domain of a new specialized field of enquiry, the 
                                                 
1 The “mercantile system” is the subject of discussion throughout Book IV of The Wealth of Nations. 
2 Schmoller´s most famous appraisal of mercantilism can be found in The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance 
(1931). As for Cunningham, his thoughts on the subject are spread throughout his The Growth of British Industry and 
Commerce (1903). 
3 English Theories of Foreign Trade Before Adam Smith (1930) 
4 In Chapter 23 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) 
5 Predecessors of Adam Smith (1937) 
6 Early British Economics from the XIII to the Middle of the XVIII Century (1938) 
7 Mercantilism (1931, translated into English in 1935)      
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history of economic thought, which developed swiftly due to the consolidation of economics as an 
institutionalized academic discipline. Of all these contributions, Heckscher’s was certainly the one 
who attracted more attention and stirred greater controversy. His all-encompassing attempt to come up 
with a definitive portrait of mercantilist doctrines and policies within their institutional context met 
with as much praise for its breadth and scholarship as it did with biting criticism to its methodological 
eclecticism, historiographical idiosyncrasies, and inner hesitations and contradictions. 
Still, despite its own achievements and faults, Heckscher’s work revived scholarly interest in 
early modern economic doctrines, and also brought mercantilism to the attention of every historically-
minded economist as an integral part of the past of his/her own discipline. Any textbook on the history 
of economic thought from then on required an introductory chapter discussing mercantilism, and thus 
some very standardized, common sense notions entered the field’s consciousness. Unfortunately, these 
notions were often grossly misrepresentative. Reducing two centuries of European history into twenty 
textbook pages had the noxious side effect of blurring any kind of subtle distinctions, or any kind of 
distinctions for that matter, leaving no room for diverging ideas or detailed contextual approaches. For 
the average late 20
th century economist, mercantilism meant radical nationalism, protectionism, and 
government interference, all of it resulting from an incomprehensible fixation with precious metals 
and a favorable balance of trade, which could only be explained as plain ignorance. 
But apart from these common sense ideas, serious research on the topic kept being carried 
on, frequently in direct response to Heckscher’s and Viner’s seminal works from the 1930s. This is not 
the place to indulge in a long historiographical review, and it suffice to say that relevant contributions 
were brought forth by people like Donald Coleman (1969b; 1980), Bob Coats (1973; 1992a; 1992b), 
Raymond de Roover (1951; 1955; 1974a; 1974b), Barry Supple (1954; 1957; 1964), Herbert Heaton 
(1937),  and  the  aforementioned  Charles  Wilson  (1949;  1951;  1969a;  1969b).  Debates  have  often 
centered on the general historiographical validity of the concept of “mercantilism”, while at the same 
time attempting to bring more historical depth to the analysis. More recent scholarship has tried to 
appropriate methodological ideas originating in other social sciences – the most relevant approaches 
being Joyce Appleby’s mercantilism-as-liberal-ideology (1978), Lars Magnusson’s mercantilism-as-
economic-language (1994), and Andrea Finkelstein’s mercantilism-as-organicist-political-philosophy 
(2000). Yet, for all the richness and insightfulness achieved after decades of research, one of the 
remarkable features of specialized enquiry is that it still insists on treating every single economic idea 
that has been expressed in Europe after Thomas Aquinas and before François Quesnay as a unified, 
consistent  doctrinal  corpus.  And  while  some  more  careful  interpreters  have  restricted  their 
generalizing urge to shorter samples – dealing only with England throughout the whole of the 17
th 
century, for instance – there remains a lingering uneasiness, a sense that this is far too long a period 
for any idea to hold a complete and undisputed sway over the minds of a whole nation. 
My aim is to try and mitigate this uneasiness, by leaving aside for a minute the sweeping 
ideologies and grand historical transitions and focusing instead on the actual ideas held by actual 
people in a specific historical context: the severe economic crisis which assaulted England during the 
last years of James I’s reign. 
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* * * 
 
The idea is obviously not new. Hundreds of pages have been written about the difficulties 
surrounding  the  idea  of  “mercantilism”,  Donald  Coleman  being  for  a  long  time  the  most  vocal 
advocate of a complete eradication of the concept
8. Yet, for all the methodological diatribes, little 
seems  to  have  been  done  in  the  sense  of  turning  such  abstract  ideas  into  proper  historical 
examinations. One of the most recent contributions to the field (FINKELSTEIN, 2000), for all its 
careful and detailed analysis, still treats all economic pamphlets printed in the 17
th century as part of 
some unified and coherent tradition, paying much more attention to their common features than to 
what tells them apart. 
In the scarce instances when attention was given to the particular historical context in which 
economic  ideas  came  to  light,  the  1620’s  always  emerged  as  some  sort  of  watershed  in  the 
“mercantilist” era – a moment of critical ideological density, when not only a significant amount of 
literature was produced, but also some of the most relevant economic issues of the time were debated 
at some length. From the standpoint of economic history and policy, the period was extensively dealt 
with by SUPPLE (1964), which remains the standard interpretation of macroeconomic events in the 
period. Regarding economic ideas, both APPLEBY (1978) and MAGNUSSON (1994) have assigned 
a very prominent role to the 1620’s in their works, portraying the decade as a moment of transition in 
England, when traditional, quasi-medieval notions were being left behind in favor of new, progressive 
ideas  which  recognized  the  independence  of  some  economic  mechanisms  from  the  discretionary 
interference of statesmen, as well as the pervasiveness of economic motives. Despite the scent of 
Whig history, the fact remains that economic issues were a hot enough topic during the late years of 
James’ reign to catch the attention of contemporary scholars working in the field. So what is it about 
the 1620’s that made it such a fertile moment for economic enquiry? 
To answer this question, one must consider briefly the economic conditions of the time. The 
political  and  constitutional  struggles  that  permeated  the  early  Stuart  period  frequently  obfuscate 
economic difficulties, but these were nonetheless present and exerted their impact. James inherited a 
kingdom  exhausted  by  a  protracted  period  of  demanding  foreign  conflicts,  where  frequent  fiscal 
exactions  led  to  growing  popular  discontent.  Moreover,  the  last  years  of  Elizabeth’s  reign  were 
characterized by chronic sluggishness in foreign trade, leading to a rather bleak economic landscape. 
Nevertheless, Stuart accession and peace with Spain brought about a general improvement in trade 
conditions. James’ first decade as king of England was one of undoubted prosperity. White broadcloth 
exports grew constantly, reaching their highest ever level in 1614. Prices were on the rise, and so were 
rents. But beneath the glowing surface of economic life, profound changes were taking place within 
England’s main industry. Early 17
th century witnessed a dual movement within British woolen cloth 
industry: the decay of the traditional, luxurious white and undressed woolen cloth – “the jewel of the 
kingdom” – and the rise of the lighter and coarser mixed fabrics collectively known as new draperies. 
This process was already in course during the first decade of the century, and was still to go on for 
                                                 
8 The volume Revisions in Mercantilism (1969), edited by Coleman, is a compilation of articles which deal, to a greater or 
lesser extent, with the inadequacy of “mercantilism” as a historiographical category. Coleman’s own views on the matter 
are expressed in the Introduction and on his paper there reprinted (1969b).      
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much longer
9. However, an unhappy attempt at government interference – the infamous Cockayne 
project
10 – brought about a precipitous decline in the traditional sector. White broadcloth exports 
peaked in 1614, never to reach the same level again. From 1615 to 1618, when the project was being 
put into practice, this whole branch of cloth manufacture faced constant and severe distress. Although 
going through a secular decline, white broadcloths were still the main export item for England, and 
such a disruption in its trade was bound to have strong economic implications for the country as a 
whole. Moreover, after the project was finally repealed, and everything was expected to go back to 
normality, a new series of disturbances hit England’s cloth trade badly. Those were related to the 
beginning of hostilities in Central Europe, and the severe monetary disturbances that ensued
11. Not 
having time to fully recover from one major setback, England’s cloth trade found itself once again 
plunged into depression. 
Thus, by the dawn of the 1620’s England’s economic prospects did not look nearly as bright 
as they had a decade or so before. Economic grievances had been piling up since at least 1615, and the 
new  trade  crisis  was  already  unfolding  in  all  its  unprecedented  harshness.  Parliament  had  not 
convened since 1614, when in 1621 an indebted king was finally forced to call a meeting in order to 
deal with religious conflicts on the continent. All the economic distresses accumulated during those 
seven years were bound to appear in Westminster, and so they did. The 1621 parliament brought a 
whole array of economic issues into public scrutiny, and forced different groups to reflect about them 
and voice their opinions. One of the results was a burst of activity in economic pamphleteering. 
 
* * * 
 
The most significant economic tracts conceived during the first half of the 17
th century were 
directly  related  to  the  early  1620’s  economic  disturbances  and  their  public  investigation  in  the 
parliament of 1621. The clearest example of this is undoubtedly the public controversy which took 
place  between  Gerard  de  Malynes  and  Edward  Misselden  during  the  early  years  of  the  decade. 
Malynes was already, by then, an experienced pamphleteer and businessman, having published his 
first tract in 1601
12, and engaged in a series of projects, both public and private, which at times 
brought him wealth, at others infamy
13. By the end of the 1610’s, he was in the Fleet due to his 
involvement in a disastrous project for the coinage of copper tokens. Moral standards aside, Malynes’ 
close contact with the projecting and business worlds certainly gave him much practical knowledge, 
and  he  was  frequently  called  forth  by  the  crown  to  give  his  opinion  on  economic  matters  –  in 
particular those related to monetary mechanisms, about which he liked to style himself as a specialist. 
                                                 
9   For general assessments of economic conditions during the late 16th and early 17th centuries, see WILSON (1965; 1969c; 
1976), SUPPLE (1964), COLEMAN (1977), FISHER (1950), HINTON (1959), and UNWIN (1966). 
10 The most detailed account of the Cockayne project available is still that of FRIIS (1927). Some of Friis’ arguments have 
been questioned and updated by SUPPLE (1964). 
11  Although  SUPPLE  (1964)  offers  the  most  authoritative  account  of  the  early  1620’s  crisis,  GOULD  (1954)  and 
KINDLERBERGER (1991) are also of great interest. 
12 Saint George for England, Allegorically Described (1601). 
13 Those interested in Malynes’ career can find fragmentary biographical accounts in MUCHMORE (1969), JOHNSON 
(1936),  ROOVER  (1974b),  MAGNUSSON  (1994),  and  FINKELSTEIN  (2000),  as  well  as  the  entry  in  the  Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (2004, vol. 36, pp. 380-2).      
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Edward Misselden was, in all probability, a much younger merchant than Malynes, although 
his early biography is rather obscure
14. He was a Merchant Adventurer during the 1610’s, and as such 
was deeply involved in the events surrounding the Cockayne project. Initially a harsh opponent of the 
new company, he later joined its ranks, only to be accused of trying to sabotage it from the inside. 
During the early 1620’s, he was still a member of the restored old company, and it was with a view to 
clear his company of blame for the trade crisis that in 1622 he published his first pamphlet, Free 
Trade, or, The Meanes to Make Trade Flourish. This was the piece of literature which triggered the 
debate between Malynes and him. Malynes replied with The Maintenance of Free Trade, published 
the same year, in which he explicitly contested Misselden’s interpretation of the economic depression 
in England. Misselden struck back with incredible ferocity the following year, in his The Circle of 
Commerce, or the Ballance of Trade – a pamphlet which is often credited as the first appearance in 
print of the term “balance of trade”. His virulent assault on Malynes prompted an immediate – and 
final – reply by the latter, entitled The Center of the Circle of Commerce – in reference to the analogy 
proposed by Misselden between Gioto’s circle and a nation’s foreign trade. 
Apart from Malynes and Misselden, one other figure also looms large within the universe of 
early Stuart economic reasoning. This last figure is also the one of greatest fame: Thomas Mun, the 
Levant  and  East  India  merchant  whom  history  turned  into  the  most  iconic  mouthpiece  of 
mercantilism
15.  Well,  history  and  Adam  Smith,  who  singled  Mun  as  the  author  whose  ideas 
represented the mercantile creed. Yet, for all the attention he received, Mun’s part in the 1620’s 
debates was overlooked for quite a long time. Although his first pamphlet, A Discourse of Trade, from 
England unto the East Indies, was published in 1621 with the clear intention of defending the East 
India Company against accusations made in parliament of draining English bullion stocks, the work 
through which he became known to posterity – England’s Treasure by Foraign Trade – was only 
published posthumously, in 1664. But if the precise moment in which the tract was composed remains 
unknown, any careful reading of its contents, if informed by some knowledge of the issues at stake 
during the early 1620’s, clearly suggests what specialized research has satisfactorily established: the 
tract was the product of Mun’s reflection upon the economic troubles and debates of those years. He 
took an active part in the public investigations, and all that must have had a lasting impact on his 
thinking. 
One of the most remarkable features of the 1620’s pamphlet controversies is the highly 
abstract  level  at  which  the  debate  is  carried. The  tone  is  in  general  quite  pragmatic,  the  authors 
constantly keeping an eye on the objective measures that could be employed in order to improve 
general economic conditions. However, there are some fundamental principles at stake, and these are 
framed in such a way as to make it impossible to reach a resolution regarding which standpoint is the 
correct  one.  In  other  words,  they  work  as  fundamental  axioms  which  can  be  neither  proved  nor 
disproved by empirical evidence, but upon which the whole reasoning rests. This will become clearer 
later on. 
                                                 
14  Misselden’s  biographical  information  is  significantly  more  scarce  than  Malynes’.  The  most  enlightening  sources  are 
JOHNSON (1936), MAGNUSSON (1994), FINKELSTEIN (2000) and the Oxford DNB entry (2004, v. 38, pp. 375-6). 
15 Fortunately we know much more about Mun than about Malynes and Misselden. Quite satisfactory accounts can be found, 
once again, in JOHNSON (1936), MAGNUSSON (1994), and FINKELSTEIN (2000), but also in APPLEBY (1994), 
ROOVER (1957), SUPPLE (1954), and in the Oxford DNB entry (2004, v. 39, pp. 730-2).      
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Seventeenth century economic writers have been blamed once and again for their excessive 
concern with precious metals. Smith was the first to accuse them of indulging in Midas’ fallacy – 
confusing wealth with money; Heckscher, albeit more sympathetic, still described it as a “monetary 
fetish”, resulting from the swift spreading of monetary relations throughout European society, and the 
confusion arising thereof in the minds of those which had to deal with such deep changes. At a certain 
level,  these  indictments  are  accurate  as  regards  the  period  of  concern  here:  early  17
th  century 
pamphleteers  were  indeed  obsessed  with  money.  But  this  obsession  was  not  due  to  any  sort  of 
cognitive blindness, but rather to much more straightforward reasons: first, they believed that money 
had an all-important role to play within the sphere of economic activities, and that an adequate supply 
was  therefore  required  to  ensure  the  nation’s  well-being;  secondly,  these  authors  displayed  a 
remarkable aversion to domestic consumption of goods, and therefore money (that is, precious metals) 
was regarded as a preferable form of wealth due to its durability – a form of wealth which could not 
be consumed
16. 
This latter point, fascinating as it is, will not be explored here at length, simply because it 
was not one of the controversial issues at stake. Rather, it was an assumption shared by all those 
involved  in  the  debates,  which  implicitly  or  explicitly  treated  consumption  as  the  destruction  of 
wealth. Mun expresses the idea clearly when he says that “to lose and to consume doth produce one 
and the same reckoning” (1664, p. 85), but it is also present elsewhere, under several guises. The word 
“consumption” itself often assumes a negative connotation, being entangled with the ideas of disease, 
decay, and putrefaction – as in “the consumption of the body politic”. The constant exhortations to 
frugality can also be seen as another manifestation of this deep-rooted suspicion towards consumption, 
and as such it went on unchallenged during the 1620’s. 
The former issue, on the contrary, was the focus of much attention. In fact, the economic 
disturbances of the period are frequently described as a “scarcity of money” crisis, especially during 
the  initial  years  of  depression,  when  its  close  connection  with  the  cloth  trade  was  still  not  fully 
recognized.  The  scarcity  of  money  was  obviously  the  most  apparent  manifestation  of  a  general 
economic crisis, but the fact remains that economic pamphleteers regarded the inadequate money 
supply as the single most important issue to be addressed. As will be discussed shortly, the diagnoses 
they offered differed greatly; but their problem was basically the same. Economic debates in England 
during the 1620’s are essentially about money, and as such they need to be understood. 
So,  why  was  money  important?  First  of  all,  we  should  note  that  there  is  absolutely  no 
confusion between money and wealth in the writings of the period. Early Stuart authors knew very 
well  the  distinction  between  these  two  concepts  and,  although  they  rarely  came  up  with  precise 
definitions, it is clear that money (or treasure) was only one of several forms which wealth could 
assume
17. The importance of money lies elsewhere, on a function which, it was believed, money 
could, and should, perform: that of dynamizing commercial activity. 
                                                 
16 These themes were developed at length elsewhere, and therefore will only be dealt with in a somehow cursory manner 
here. Readers interested in a more detailed exposition of these and other related points are referred to SUPRINYAK 
(2009). 
17 Once again, this assertion is more lengthily developed and substantiated in SUPRINYAK (2009, pp. 587-91).      
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It  is  in  this  sense that the  frequent analogies between  the  circulation  of  money  and  the 
circulation of blood must be interpreted. Money is the “vital spirit of trade” because wherever it goes 
through, things are animated in its wake. Merchants can afford to trade, husbandmen can sell their 
produce,  prices  and rents rise,  and  the sovereign’s  revenue  increases.  But in order  to  reach  such 
beneficial outcomes, it is not enough to possess a large stock of money – locked up in the prince’s 
coffers, for instance; money needs to be kept continually in circulation, a point stressed by Mun. 
Despite their bitter dispute over other matters, Malynes and Misselden are on the same page as regards 
the proper role of money in the commonwealth. In The Center of the Circle of Commerce, Malynes 
would ask: 
 
Or  will  any  man  think  that  Trade  can  be  driven  conveniently  without  moneys  and 
exchanges? will not the want of it make a dead Trade within the Realme when this Vitall 
Spirit  of  Commerce  faileth?  surely  it  is  questionles  in  every  mans  understanding 
(MALYNES, 1623, p. vii) 
Whereas Misselden, in Free Trade, had already declared: 
For Money is the vitall spirit of trade, and if the Spirits faile, needes must the Body faint. 
And as the Body of Trade seemeth to be Dead without the Life of Money: so do also the 
Members of the Commonwealth without their Meanes of Trade (MISSELDEN, 1622, p. 28) 
 
The issues discussed so far seem to be the object of common consent among early Stuart 
economic pamphleteers. It is time now to finally approach the sources of controversy, often translated 
into  mutual  hatred.  The  early  17
th  century  was  a  period  of  intense  development  in  international 
exchange markets, when the bill of exchange was quickly turning into the most prominent commercial 
instrument within Europe. However, exchange markets were still a domain reserved for specialists. 
The average man on the streets regarded it as an impenetrable and highly suspicious world – much in 
the same way as it still happens nowadays. Neither were international financial markets simpler in 
those days than they are today – even trained scholars normally have a hard time trying to grasp all the 
nuances involved in a simple 17
th century exchange dealing. 
Part of the problem is due to the use of a currency system based on precious metals. As such, 
coins have an intrinsic value determined strictly by their metallic content. Domestically, however, the 
value of coins is determined by the sovereign, frequently in disagreement with their fineness and 
weight.  Thus,  in  the  exchange  market  –  which  is the  market  for  bills  of  exchange  –  the  rate  of 
exchange  between  two  currencies  is  determined  by  an  estimate  of  their  equivalence  in  terms  of 
metallic content, but also by fluctuations in the demand and supply of currencies in a given exchange 
mart at any moment. If several English merchants in Amsterdam suddenly required rijksdaalder for 
their business, the rate of exchange between the sterling and the Dutch currency would rise, even 
though their point of metallic equivalence was reached at a lower rate. To complicate matters even 
further, bills of exchange were payable after fixed time intervals, and therefore normally included 
interest and risk-bearing prizes
18. 
                                                 
18 More comprehensive and detailed account of monetary and financial systems in Early Modern Europe can be found in 
KINDLEBERGER (1993), EINAUDI (1953), GOULD (1952), ROOVER (1974a), SUPPLE (1957), and UNWIN (1966).      
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It  was  precisely  in  their  analysis  of  this  exchange  market  that  Misselden  and  Malynes 
adopted inescapably divergent standpoints. Malynes’ perspective is certainly the most unusual one for 
modern standards, but not less sharp for that. In characteristic style, he argues that both monetary and 
commodity flows are ultimately determined by fluctuations in the exchange market – or to use his own 
words, “exchange is active, and commodities and money are passive” (1623, p. 84). This proposition 
was firmly anchored on his particular perception of the functioning of exchange markets. Malynes was 
a biting critic of the free determination of exchange rates between currencies in the international 
market.  To  him,  determining  the  value  of  money  was  part  of  the  sovereign’s  prerogative;  thus, 
allowing  it  to  freely  float  according  to  market  forces,  manipulated  by  bankers,  merchants,  and 
speculators, was a morally reproachable attitude – an usurpation of the royal prerogative. Money is 
publica mensura, the general standard of value, and therefore arbitrary fluctuations on its own value 
are highly prejudicial to general economic stability. To Malynes, the “abuse” of exchange was the root 
of England’s commercial decadence. 
Malynes  believed  exchanges  between  currencies  should  be  based  exclusively  on  their 
metallic  content.  Rates should  be regulated in such  a  way  as to commute  equivalent  amounts  of 
precious metals – that is, according to his famous concept of par pro pari. When that is not the case, 
all  other  economic  flows  are  suddenly  subordinated  to  the  rulings  of  this  primordial  market,  the 
exchange market. If a currency is “undervalued” in the exchange market, there are arbitrage gains to 
be made through melting and exporting it as bullion; equally, the commodity market suffers due to 
changes in relative international prices, which adversely affect foreign trade. Moreover, if foreign 
currency is “overvalued”, it is unprofitable altogether to bring it in, be it as bullion or currency, and 
thus commercial revenues are turned into imports of foreign commodities, as a means of minimizing 
exchange losses – further contributing to the “overbalancing” of trade (1601a, p. 34).  
What distinguishes Malynes’ standpoint from those of Misselden and Mun is the direction in 
which the causality runs according to his interpretation of markets. To him, the exchange market 
literally dominates those of money and commodities – or as he put it, “the right course of exchange 
being  abused,  doth  over-rule  the  course  of  commodities  and  monie”  (1601a,  p.  17).  Profit 
opportunities on exchange markets will always determine overall economic flows, and commodities 
are the variables used to cover monetary imbalances. The only way to avoid this is by neutralizing the 
exchange market, forcing all transactions to be carried according to the par pro pari. After potential 
profits in exchange dealings are thus eliminated, both the monetary and commodity markets are free to 
follow their own courses. 
This  may  sound  like  a  rationalization  imposed  on  Malynes’  ramblings.  The  strongest 
evidence to the contrary is that the three authors themselves showed great awareness that this was, in 
fact, the crucial issue. Misselden, although arguing the contrary case, hesitates to put all his emphasis 
on the commodity market. Despite all his concern with the balance of trade, he believes that some 
monetary mechanisms do have an important role to play in economic processes. Misselden ridicules 
Malynes’  par  pro  pari  project,  but  recognizes  that  the  “undervaluation”  of  English  currency  – 
meaning its closer correspondence to its own metallic content – is a factor inducing money outflows 
(1622,  p.  7-8).  But  elsewhere  he  is  concerned  with  establishing  his  own  ideas  regarding  the 
relationships between markets. To him, the exchange market shares the same characteristics of any 
other market, responding to the demand and supply of international currencies:      
  13 
[I]t is not the rate of Exchanges, but the value of monies, here lowe, elsewhere high, which 
cause their Exportation: nor doe the Exchanges, but the plenty or scarcity cause their values 
(MISSELDEN, 1622, p. 104) 
Likewise, the commodity market also followed its own rules: 
[I]t is not the rate of Exchanges, whether it be higher or lower, that maketh the price of 
comodities [sic] deare or cheape, as Malynes would here inferre; but it is the plenty or 
scarcity of Commodities, their use or Non-use, that maketh them rise and fall in prices 
(MISSELDEN, 1623, p. 21)  
 
Thus, Misselden understood clearly what was at stake and, although half-heartedly, gave his 
own version of events. Mun, of course, went much further; and in his direct confrontation of Malynes’ 
ideas lies the key to understand the fundamental intellectual divergence raised by this debate. Unlike 
Misselden, Mun was not willing to make concessions. Chapters XII to XIV of England’s Treasure are 
dedicated to an explicit criticism of Malynes’ ideas regarding exchange markets. As Misselden before 
him,  Mun  begins  by  stating  that  exchange  markets  are  governed  by  the  demand  and  supply  of 
currencies: 
 
[T]hat which causeth an under or overvaluing of moneys by Exchange, is the plenty or 
scarcity thereof in those places where the Exchanges are made (MUN, 1664, p. 95) 
 
But  his  analysis  soon  turns  much  more  acute  and  to  the  point.  Far  from  determining 
commodity flows, exchange markets merely reflect the movements of commodities between nations. 
Commercial imbalances need to be covered by monetary transfers, which in their turn exert pressures 
over exchange markets, thus affecting exchange rates. His own description of the process is as sharp as 
it is illuminating: 
 
As plenty or scarcity of mony do make the price of the exchange high or low, so the over or 
under balance of our trade doth effectually cause the plenty or scarcity of mony. […] the 
monies which are carried from us within the balance of our trade are not considerable, for 
they do return to us again: and we lose those monies only which are made of the over-
balance of our general trade, that is to say, That which we spend more in value in forraign 
wares, than we utter of our own commodities. And the contrary of this is the only means by 
which we get our treasure. In vain therefore hath Gerard Malines laboured so long, and in so 
many printed books to make the world believe that the undervaluing of our money in the 
exchange doth exhaust our treasure, which is a mere fallacy of the cause, attributing that to a 
Secondary means, whose effects are wrought by another Principal Efficient, and would also 
come to pass although the said Secondary means were not at all (MUN, 1664, pp. 96-104) 
 
Mun turns Malynes’ reasoning on its head, and proudly tells everyone he is doing so. If any 
doubts still remained, he went as far as appropriating himself of Malynes’ own phraseology to hammer 
his point home:      
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[T]he profit and loss upon the Exchange is guided and ruled by the over or under balance of 
the several Trades which are Predominant and Active, making the price of Exchange high or 
low,  which  is  therefore  Passive,  the  contrary  whereof  is  so  often  repeated  by  the  said 
Malynes (MUN, 1664, p. 119) 
 
Here we have in a nutshell what the 1620’s dispute was all about. Which is the primary force 
behind  economic  processes,  money  or  commodities?  Was  the  economic  crisis  due  to  the 
malfunctioning of international monetary mechanisms, or to a chronic imbalance in foreign trade? 
Distinct answers were being advanced at the same time, and we can only guess at how deeply each of 
them appealed to public consciousness. We know that, in the long run, Mun’s standpoint prevailed, 
which certainly helps to explain why Malynes came to be regarded as such an oddity. But it seems 
that, during the 1620’s, his ideas were far from absurd and unconventional, or even outmoded. Quite 
on the contrary, they may have still carried much weight, as Misselden’s own hesitations seem to 
indirectly show. Probably few people would be willing to go so far as to assert that exchange markets 
are the ultimate determinants of all economic phenomena. But the idea that there was something about 
money  which  could  potentially  disrupt  both  foreign  trade  and  domestic  activities  still  held  much 
appeal. The debate had not been won before it started. Instead, it was carried on fiercely because it 
was concerned with issues which occupied many minds at the time, and to which no easy solution 
could be offered. The controversy was not a futile quarrel over theoretical points, but part of a larger 
effort to come to grips with the logic behind economic phenomena. 
 
* * * 
 
Since  merchants  have  received  all  the  attention  so  far,  from  now  on  the  presence  of 
economic ideas outside the scope of pamphlets will be explored. Arguably, one of the gravest faults of 
“mercantilist” scholarship is its excessive reliance on specialized literature, and disregard of economic 
ideas expressed in wider, less knowledgeable channels. For all the growth in print culture, it is hard to 
believe that an economic pamphleteer writing during the early Stuart years could hope to reach an 
audience much larger than his own merchant community. If that is the case in general, what to say of a 
work such as England’s Treasure by Foraign Trade, which was not even published until after the 
Restoration? What sort of impact could the work of Mun have over the minds of his contemporaries, if 
he did not actively engage in debates carried on in other, more wide-reaching stages? 
Of course, when thus extending the analysis to cover wider transmission channels, it is much 
harder, if not impossible, to determine how influential were particular individuals and their ideas. But 
that is not the only, nor necessarily the most interesting, question to be asked. Instead, what one can 
hope to grasp is what kind of relationship, if any, existed between the reasoning of those specialists in 
economic  matters,  and  the  way  in  which  the  public  at  large  regarded  the  same  phenomena.  Our 
contemporary experiences would certainly induce a high degree of skepticism regarding the existence 
of any such relationship; but maybe a closer investigation will reveal early Stuart days to be some kind 
of mythical lost era when economists and human beings could still live peacefully with each other. 
As already mentioned earlier, the parliament of 1621 was in a way a moment of catharsis for 
economic ideas. Although other subjects such as the Palatinate crisis, non-conformity policies, and      
  15 
patents of monopoly gathered more attention, economic issues undoubtedly occupied a prominent 
place in the proceedings. James himself touched the subject in his opening address to parliament, 
saying: 
 
For the scarcitie of coine, it is strange that my Mint for silver hath not gone this nyne or ten 
years. Yea, so long it hath stood out of use that I and my council cannot think to see silver 
coined there againe in our time. How this may be redressed it concerneth you to consider 
now in Parliament and let your King have your best advice about it (CD, 1621, VI:371-2
19) 
 
Thus, James was not only concerned with monetary disturbances – only natural given that 
the currency undisputedly belonged to the royal prerogative – but also willing to ask parliament for 
advice on how to deal with them. King and parliament would be involved with economic issues 
throughout the whole session, although the immediate practical results of such consultations were less 
than remarkable. The Commons asked their king to dedicate special care to the redress of economic 
grievances during the summer adjournment
20, and the Privy Council, already following Sir Lionel 
Cranfield’s lead, accordingly engaged in investigating and reforming the inconveniences raised in the 
house
21. Economic topics were on the spotlight during the whole year of 1621. What exactly, then, 
were the Commons concerned with, economic wise, and how were these concerns approached by 
different voices in the house? 
The depressed state of England’s cloth trade, and the king’s explicitly stated concern with 
the scarcity of money, somehow encapsulate the two main economic themes under discussion in the 
House of Commons during that session. However, interestingly enough, these two lines of enquiry 
were dealt with for quite some time as roughly distinct issues. Both subjects were eventually brought 
to the house’s attention, and the same pattern emerged: several reasons were advanced as possible 
explanations for each of the problems, but only very sporadically any direct relationships between the 
two of them were hypothesized
22. As the economic grievances continued to be intensely debated, some 
rapprochement was eventually achieved – although an incomplete and often awkward one at that (CD, 
1621, III:371). 
Thus, in their attempts to examine England’s economic maladies, the Commons came across 
the problem of the relationship between monetary and trade processes. This is also, as argued above, 
the  single  most  important  topic  in  early  Stuart  economic  literature.  These issues,  which  virtually 
defined economic reasoning during the period, were brought to light in the 1621 parliament, when 
attempts were being made to reconcile cloth trade depression and scarcity of money as interconnected 
economic problems.  
The  desirability  of  a  more  plenteous  money  supply  was  normally  assumed  rather  than 
explicitly  argued,  and  so  the  inquiry  naturally  turned  upon  the  appropriate  measures  to  induce 
                                                 
19 The reference is to the collection Commons Debates, 1621, edited by Wallace Notestein, Frances Helen Relf and Hartley 
Simpson. 
20 Cf. CD, 1621, II:417; III:404; IV:398-9. 
21 Cf. CD, 1621, III:415-6; Acts of the Privy Council, V:391-2, 393, 400; VI:40;71. 
22 Cf. CD, 1621, II:29-30, 76-7, 137; IV:19, 97-8, 104-5; V:3-4, 261, 331, 439-40, 456-8, 524-5; VI:16.      
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monetary inflows. Since the connection between scarce money and the cloth trade crisis was not 
accepted by everyone, the debates witnessed a slight polarization of opinions. On the one hand, there 
were those who argued that strictly monetary phenomena – such as international imbalances in the 
gold/silver ratio and the low rates paid for silver in the English mint – were behind the liquidity crisis; 
on the other, some of the members believed that the answer to England’s economic troubles was to be 
found on the decayed state of the balance of trade. As a general rule, these opposed lines of reasoning 
were  not  clearly  and  unequivocally  presented,  being  frequently  mixed  with  other  arguments  of  a 
different nature. Both of them, however, could find their champions – voices who were willing to 
emphasize the dominance of one or the other of these mechanisms over the economic process. 
 Among  those  who  favored  the  “monetary”  interpretation,  the  most  vocal  ones  were 
members involved to a greater or lesser degree with the East India Company, as well as partisans of 
other regulated companies such as the French Company and the Merchant Adventurers. Influential 
people like Sir Thomas Roe and Sir Dudley Digges tried to shift the blame off their own group’s 
shoulders, and focused instead on the adverse effects that international monetary mechanisms could 
exert  over  England,  independently  of  any  trade  processes  whatsoever
23.  But,  although  gathering 
important supporters, this proposition did not go unchallenged. Those concerned with the balance of 
trade argued that, quite on the contrary, the disrupted state of the cloth trade was the true responsible 
for  the  economic  troubles,  including  the  scarcity  of  money
24.  Among  the  latter  group,  the  most 
prominent voice was undoubtedly that of Sir Lionel Cranfield
25. 
The concept of a “balance of trade” was widely used in parliament at the time, and the idea 
that commercial imbalances had to be compensated with monetary flows was certainly not new at the 
time. However, what is interesting is that certain members – especially Cranfield – were absolutely 
convinced of the overbearing influence exerted by the balance of trade over the international monetary 
system. Whenever any of the more monetary-oriented minds would try to argue their case, Cranfield 
would quickly seize the word and stress the lessons taught by the customs books, stating that “Wee are 
to assure ourselves that the want of money is because trade is sick, and as longe as trade is sick, wee 
shalbee in want of money” (CD, 1621, VI:296). More importantly, Cranfield was in a formidable 
position to do so. When the 1621 parliamentary session started, he was already recognized as the 
crown’s main economic advisor. During the summer adjournment, he would finally be made Lord 
Treasurer,  and  thus  become  arguably  the  most  powerful  and  influential  court  officer,  apart  from 
Buckingham. Under these circumstances, his opinions, in all likelihood, carried substantial weight. 
No solid agreement was ever reached in parliament regarding the merits of each of these 
opposed standpoints. But despite their failure to reach a consensual interpretation of the crisis, MPs in 
1621 brought to the forefront the difficulties surrounding the integration of money and international 
trade in a coherent explanation of economic processes. In so doing, they provided economic writers 
with a theme they would insistently pursue throughout the remainder of the decade. 
 
                                                 
23 Cf. CD, 1621, II:138-9; III:45-6, 48-9; IV:149-50, 358; V:314, 491-2, 517, 526-7. 
24 Cf. CD, 1621, IV:230, 394; V:492, 517; VI:296. 
25  Cranfield’s  life  and  career,  both  as  merchant  and  officer,  are  wonderfully  documented  in  TAWNEY  (1958)  and 
PRESTWICH (1966).      
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* * * 
 
Lionel Cranfield’s firm belief in the primordial influence exerted by the balance of trade 
over economic processes raises some interesting issues. Could it be that, through his position as an 
influential public figure, Cranfield contributed more to the dissemination of a favorable-balance-of-
trade doctrine during the early Stuart period than economic pamphleteers such as Thomas Mun? To 
what extent could the abstract leanings of an important minister influence the course of public policy? 
These are intriguing questions, to which no easy answer can be found. But Cranfield’s position at the 
time  suggests  yet  another  possibility.  As  the  merchant  and  financier  who  rose  to  occupy  an  all-
important public office, Cranfield must have exerted a powerful stimulus over those merchants who 
thought they had something relevant to say about economic matters. The mere prospect of being heard 
by a Lord Treasurer who was not only interested, but could actually understand what they had to say, 
must have motivated reflection and analytical effort in people who would normally follow political 
wrangles only at a distance. 
Mun and Cranfield had business connections dating back to the latter’s days in the City, and 
it seems reasonable to suppose that Mun would feel much more comfortable approaching Cranfield 
than Dorset, Suffolk, or Mandeville
26. Moreover, this was a two-way avenue, for after parliament was 
over Mun was called to be a member of the Privy Council committee for examining the decay of cloth 
trade, and later of the standing commission for trade. Cranfield had been involved a few years earlier 
in  an  attempt  to  actually compile  England’s  balance  of  trade,  and that  was duly  remembered  by 
Misselden when he dedicated The Circle of Commerce to the Lord Treasurer:  
 
When the eye of heaven, in the eye of the king, had looked upon you, and picked you out, 
and placed you in a higher orb; you were first seene in this circle, of the balance of trade. 
Other faire pieces you had, but this was your master piece, because all the rest had reference 
unto this (MISSELDEN, 1623, p. iii) 
 
Shortly  thereafter,  Misselden  clearly  expresses  these  mixed  feelings  of  flattery  and 
fellowship when he says “for as you were of us, and now you are farre above us; so can you judge, as 
farre beyond us, as you are distant from us” (1623, p. v). Even Malynes tried to reach the balance-of-
trade  oriented  treasurer,  going  so  far  as  to  ask  permission  in  a  letter  to  dedicate  his  book  Lex 
Mercatoria to him
27. The book was printed in 1622 without the said dedicatory, for reasons that can 
only be speculated. 
This close relationship between economic pamphleteers and the political society at large 
comes into sharp relief when one compares parliamentary debates in 1621 with the economic literature 
which came up during the rest of the decade. The issues approached are the same, and it is possible to 
see  how  economic  writers  actually  responded  to  the  anxieties  and  difficulties  exhibited  by  their 
countrymen. Far from being idle abstract speculators, or even mere pleaders for vested interests, they 
showed acute awareness about the most pressing economic questions of their time. Outside of this 
                                                 
26 All of which had, at different times, occupied the position of Lord Treasurer during James I’s reign. 
27 Centre for Kentish Studies: Sackville Manuscripts, U269/1/OE461.      
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context, their works may seem dull and meaningless; but the blueprint offered by the public debates 
which surrounded England’s economic troubles in early Stuart times give us a glimpse of how vital 
they must have seemed to those involved.      
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